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Abstract 
Research Tools in Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection are highly dependent on appropriate traffic trace data. 
Traditional datasets present several issues such as : removal of sensitive information (anonymization) and 
insufficient number or volume of attack instances, which limit their quality for the design and evaluation of A -
NIDSs. In this paper, we present a method for anomalous traffic filtering which can be used for generating anomaly-
free traffic traces. The sanitized dataset can be used to improve the computation of the behaviour profiles during the 
training stage. The proposal is based on the construction and statistical analysis of the flow-level entropy space for 
the identification of outliers using three entropy estimators. Empirical results showed that the new traffic traces of 
the sanitized dataset have a distributional similarity among them greater than that presented among the original 
datasets. 
Keywords: flow-level traffic filtering; entropy; network security; A-NIDS. 
1. Introduction 
The current trend for connectivity to converged IP networks implies a sustained increase in the amount of 
information running through this medium. However, it also provides a means for initiating malicious activities as 
may be attacks on networks. The steady increase in incidents that threaten the security requires innovative methods 
for detecting anomalous activities  that the current Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) must be able to 
identify, [1]. The current Internet connections to high-speed networks involve traffic of gigabits per second which 
engages intense analysis trying to examine and identify the behavior at packet level. Currently, there is an approach 
for aggregated information of related packets of network traffic in the form of flows in order to reduce the analysis 
on the amount of packets, [2]. Hence, the flows supply information and patterns about the traffic instead of packet 
analysis, [3]. The presented proposal is based on the flow-level analysis. A flow is defined as a stream of packets 
that are observed at a given interface that share the following five characteristics: source and destination IP address, 
source and destination port number, and the same protocol. 
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The proposed method, see section 5 and 6, is intended to improve the performance of the A-NIDSs as the training 
phase relies on better set of datatraces. Then, the requirement to have a reliable training phase is better fulfill when 
the datatraces are anomaly free. Furthermore, from the point of view of performance evaluation of new methods for 
A-NIDS purpose is important to have benchmark of traffic traces. However, there is a lack of suitable traffic traces 
for this purpose. Thus, if the proposed methodology is good enough, it can be extended to generate this type of 
datasets, [4]. 
2. Related Work 
 
As the performance of the A-NIDS depends on the training process  significantly, the aim of an anomaly-free dataset 
is to achieve the expected result for training and evaluating. The scarcity of training repositories and research on the 
field of sanitizing has led to develop innovative techniques regarding the duty of traffic filtering. 
 
The method of micro-models in [5] involves small data slices to detect and remove any anomaly not considered 
within the normal model of the training dataset. The micro-model is an approach considering small time intervals 
testing the dataset at packet level, however does not consider anomalies spread on several data slices .  
 
The Static sanitization and Dynamic sanitization handle anonymized datasets with an approach of the content and 
the structured data, [6]. The raw data is transformed into an appropriate structured format. The sanitization takes the 
structured data, converts it into a representation and applies the sanitization rule s similar to signature-based 
detection. 
 
The Database Partitioning considers a labeling process to obtain a dataset attack-free according to the rulesets 
getting clean, anomalous and attacks subsets, [7]. The traffic is filtered using an old set of rules and then an up-to-
date set of rules for the same tool depending on the database of anomalies but recent and known ones could not be 
detected. 
 
3. Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
NIDSs monitor the behavior of the network traffic in order to raise alerts when possible intrusions or suspicious 
patterns are observed. NIDSs must be highly reliable and have low false alarm rate, [8]. For A-NIDSs, the training 
represents the period of greatest need to have a reliable system to detect anomalies. The efficiency of the training 
and evaluation involves having a repository of highly unfailing captured traffic datasets which must be anomaly-
free, reflecting the quality of this step and directly impacts the performance of the A-NIDS. 
 
Currently, we have identified three kinds of sources of datasets that can be used for training and evaluation of 
NIDSs, they are: 
 
1. Synthetic dataset. This type of datasets are generated artificially, the best known are Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup 1999 and MIT-DARPA datasets. However, since they were 
created many years ago, they do not reflect current security threats such as botnets, SQL injection, and 
worm attacks. 
2. Anonymized dataset. These kinds of datasets are captured in real networks and are constantly updated. 
However, for reasons of privacy, certain details of the traces are modified by a process called 
anonymization. This affects the utility of the trace within methods based on traffic feature distributions. 
Examples of these are the Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet (MAWI) repository, [9], the 
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National Laboratory for Advanced Network Research (NLANR), [10], and The Cooperative Association 
for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), [11]. 
3. Pseudo synthetic dataset. The traces are generated in a controlled environment, where models are 
defined by the behavior of a real network. However, the issue with this  alternative is that it generates 
specific traces according to the modeled network, [12]. 
 
Our proposal involves that a network generates its own datasets. The method is based on the traffic representation 
by the Method of Entropy Spaces (MES), on which Principal Component Analysis  (PCA) is applied and 
unsupervised techniques for identifying anomalous traffic as well, [13]. Thus, generated anomaly-free dataset 
provide better results in the training phase of the A-NIDS, which will impact positively on the performance in terms 
of accuracy and false alarms rate, [14]. Hence, the dataset will be unique and real, keeping reliability of the network. 
 
4. Entropy and Estimators 
 
Randomness, diversity, and uncertainty are present in the behavior of traffic features of all data networks for which 
the entropy is a useful tool to characterize the dynamics of certain traffic variables in terms of information theory. 
The Shannon entropy allows a measure of information according to the content of the dataset, [15]. Mathematically, 
for a discrete random variable (r.v.) , the Shannon entropy is given by (1) where  represents the probability 
distribution of the r.v. and M is the cardinality of the alphabet of . 
 
     (1) 
 
The Naïve approximation of the probability p takes to get an estimate of the entropy in (1) known as Naïve 
estimator. However this estimator has a high bias presented in (2) where  indicates the number of elements. 
      (2) 
 
The Balanced estimator subsequently introduced in [16] constitutes a low-bias method of entropy estimating which is 
defined by (3) below. 
      (3) 
 
Last, the Balanced-II estimator presented in [17] improves the computing cost and processing resources of (3) 
reducing the second summation as part of partial harmonic series  as follows in (4). 
    (4) 
 
The variations in the probability distribution of k  elements of a dataset will likewise change the characteristics of the 
traffic behavior for the same dataset. Hence, entropy estimation plays a very important role in the identification of 
those characteristics . 
 
An entropy estimation comparison between (2), (3) and (4) can be given in terms of Mean Square Error (MSE) for 
one particular kind of known discrete probability distribution such as Poisson since it is a well known and common 
in telecommunications and its entropy function is simple, which is given by (5), where  is the number of 
occurrences and  is the Poisson parameter. 
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      (5) 
Thus, we can compare the performance of the estimators in terms of MSE. Figure 1 shows the comparison for the 
case of a Poisson distribution with , ,  and sample size , from 10 to 100. Under these conditions, 
the estimator Balanced-II results on lower MSE when the length . For larger N the MSE result converges for 
the three estimators.  
Figure 1. Poisson entropy estimation comparison 
5. Entropy Spaces 
 
MES is a proposed method to perform a graphical abstraction of a network traffic trace, [18]. This abstraction is 
intended to generate a three dimensional representation comprised of data-points. Data-points patterns reflect the 
behavior of the trace. 
 
The traffic representation by the entropy spaces considers that a captured traffic  could be split onto not overlapped 
 slots of maximum duration  seconds. On a particular i-slot,  flows are generated. Four traffic features  are 
taken from the flow fields:  source IP address (srcIP),  destination IP address (dstIP),  source port number 
(srcPrt) and finally  destination port number (dstPrt). For each -slot subsequently the flows are clustered according 
the defined  feature. In this way, four cluster keys can be defined. Particularly, for a cluster key , the clusters are 
formed of flows that containing the same source IP address and variability on the remaining flows features, i.e. ,  
and  which are denoted as free dimensions. The number of forming clusters depends on the cardinality or alphabet 
size  of registered source IP addresses into the -slot.  
 
The entropy space, used in this work, is a three-dimensional representation of the captured traffic  flows. This 
space involves data-points representing the entropy of traffic flows clusters. The entropy estimation of the three free 
dimensions on a cluster  for  is represented by the vector as follows  in (6): 
      (6) 
 
For the entropy space, (6) is considered as a data-point. The data-points of the i-slot yield to  
generating points cloud data. In the same manner for the  slots of the trace  will complete the space. 
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Our technique involves analyzing the behavior of the data-points in order to identify those furthest from the group 
that begin to form outliers. Later they will be evaluated in forensic analysis at the packet level to observe the 
behavior and corroborate the anomalous activity that generated the displacement of the data-points in the entropy 
space. After the identification of the data traffic related to anomalous data points, proceed to the traffic filtering.  
 
The method of PCA allows transforming a set of correlated variables with each other into a set of uncorrela ted 
variables called principal components. The principal components result in a system of which the maximum variance 
of the data occurs on the first axis (PCA 1), the second largest variance on the second axis (PCA 2) and so on , [19].  
 
By applying PCA allows us to obtain scores that get an amplitude value and drive to dictate an outlier based on the 
highlighted value and therefore allow a dataset to identify outliers and likewise will maintain a threshold based on 
the registered values obtained from the repository. 
 
6. Experimental Results 
 
6.1 Scenario 
 
The scenario of analysis is the campus network of the Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit (UAN), which consists of 
approximately 7,000 hosts, including wired and wireless  local networks. The access to Internet through high-speed 
E3 connection as shown in Figure 2. The inside network is divided by VLANs according to campus distribution, 
facilities and offices. 
Figure 2. UAN Network general diagram 
 
6.2 Repository 
 
The trace repository for analysis consists of datasets obtained in the scenario above described regarding to 
November 07, 08, 09, 10, 11 and 18 of 2011 shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Traffic traces corresponding to dataset repository UAN 
Trace (YY/MM/DD) Time period Size (GB) Packets 
UAN-111107 07:00:00-15:00:00  2.7 5,110,923 
UAN-111108 07:00:00-15:00:00 2.5 4,047,738 
UAN-111109 07:00:00-15:00:00 2.6 4,216,903 
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UAN-111110 07:00:00-15:00:00 2.7 5,152,525 
UAN-111111 07:00:00-15:00:00 2.4 4,718,816 
UAN-111118 07:00:00-15:00:00 2.0 3,493,639 
 
6.3 Graphic Results 
 
The results were obtained through the implementation of scripts running Matlab and Perl as well as free linux tools 
such as Wireshark and tcpdump. Thus, on the entropy spaces focusing on cluster key of source IP address  the 
outliers are showed as the most distant points of the cluster, identified via Wireshark. Figure 3 shows the entropy 
space analysis for the raw trace UAN-111108 using the Naïve, Balanced and Balanced-II estimators respectively. 
Figure 3. Entropy space for raw trace UAN-111108 Cluster Key srcIP. 
Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
The comparison of the entropy spaces for the Naïve estimator regarding the Balanced and Balanced-II estimators, 
shows that the second one presents a greater concentration of data points than the other ones. This dispersion of 
Naïve estimator does not allow further highlight outliers in comparison with Balanced and Balanced-II. Through 
filtering and sanitation methods the outliers, which correspond to anomaly behavior as distant parts  containing SQL 
injection attacks, present in the trace UAN-111107 are discarded for the entropy space shown in Figure 4. This 
comparison shows again that Balanced and Balanced-II estimators have the highest concentration of data points. 
Figure 4. Entropy space sanitized trace UAN-111108 Cluster Key srcIP. 
Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
The PCA analysis for the entropy space of the trace UAN-111108 is shown in figure 5. As the graphs in the 3D 
space, there are plots for Naïve, Balanced and Balanced-II estimators left respectively. 
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Figure 5. PCA for raw trace UAN-111108. Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
The figure 6 shows the PCA analysis for sanitized trace UAN-111108. By filtering the outliers is very important to 
highlight the spaces amplitudes derived from the estimators Balanced and Balanced-II. Unlike what obtained by 
Naïve the width reductions are mostly notable. 
 
 
Figure 6. PCA for sanitized trace UAN-111108. Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
The table 2 contains a summary of the threshold values for the amplitudes for the traces repository (raw traffic 
traces) used for this analysis. An additional graphical diagnostic may be conducted us ing the Q-Q plots. It allows 
confirming the sanitization procedure by filtering out the traffic anomalies of the traces generating a new set of data-
points regarding to similar statistical properties. 
 
Table 2. Traffic traces PCA amplitude thresholds. 
Trace (YY/MM/DD) Naïve  Balanced Balanced-II 
UAN-111107 2.9 1.1 1.1 
UAN-111108 2.6 1.7 1.7 
UAN-111109 2.4 1.6 1.6 
UAN-111110 1.8 1.2 1.3 
UAN-111111 2.1 1.2 1.2 
UAN-111118 2.3 1.6 1.7 
 
367 Rafael Zempoaltecatl-Piedras et al. /  Procedia Technology  7 ( 2013 )  360 – 369 
 
The figure 7 shows a Q-Q plot regarding the raw trace UAN-111107 with the raw one UAN-111110 containing both 
outliers. Similarly, the plots contain the results of the three estimators in the same order. 
Figure 7. Q-Q Plot for raw trace UAN-111107 1st Principal Component with raw trace UAN-111110 1st Principal 
Component. Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
Finally the figure 8 displays the Q-Q plot for the sanitized trace UAN-111107 and the sanitized one UAN-111110. 
The straight line represents that the two distributions of the two traces , which are free of anomalies, are equal.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Q-Q Plot for sanitized trace UAN-111107 1st Principal Component with sanitized trace UAN-111110 
1st Principal Component. Entropy Estimator a)Naïve, b)Balanced and c)Balanced-II 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Through the related outliers, the Method of Entropy Spaces (MES) has been useful for graphically detecting 
anomalous traffic, mainly for the entropy estimators Balanced and Balanced-II. The MES was evaluated in a real 
scenario regarding to a campus network with real traffic. The method for anomalous traffic filtering to create 
training datasets for A-NIDSs is of great importance in order to achieve good performance in detecting anomalies 
and avoiding false events. The obtained results were tested with the Q-Q plot method in order to compare the traces 
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with anomalies versus the sanitized ones.  
 
Moreover, a more simple 2D analysis is provided by the PCA analysis of the entropy spaces. Although, a criterion 
for the threshold needs further studies, an average amplitude value could be set as a limit for anomalies regarding to 
the used entropy estimator as well as the analyzed traces of the particular network. Given the scarcity of suitable and 
publicly available datasets for training/evaluation, an alternative for the generation of experimental datasets from a 
production network can significantly contribute to the intrusion detection research field  
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